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Abstract
We examine labor market integration in east and southeast Asia (ESEA) during the
1980s, focusing on intraregional labor mobility and on the two other main channels
of integration: capital mobility and trade. We find evidence that labor market
integration increased sharply among ESEA countries in the 1980s, with 9 percent
of ESEA's labor force participating, either directly via labor mobility or indirectly
via capital mobility or trade, in cross-national labor market transactions in 1991, up
from just 5.2 percent in 1980. We also find that trade is the dominant mechanism
through which regional labor market integration occurred in the 1980s, with labor
migration contributing only modestly to the process.
Is an Integrated Regional Labor Market Emerging
in East and Southeast Asia?*
Economic growth is the leading concern of macroeconomic policymakers. In traditional
macroeconomic models, the main factors that promote economic growth are labor force growth,
physical and human capital accumulation, changes in the allocation of resources across economic
sectors, and technological advancement. All these factors are influenced by the integration of
national economies, a process that has gained considerable momentum in recent years because of
the erosion of economic and institutional barriers to an integrated world economy (see Bloom and
Brender 1993; Ehrenberg 1994; World Bank 1995).
Discussing the integration of particular factor and product markets is commonplace. The
movement of labor between countries is the standard indicator of international labor market
integration. Similarly, cross-national mobility of physical or financial capital is the standard
indicator of international capital market integration, while trade is the standard indicator of
international product market integration. However, integration of particular markets occurs not
only through international transactions involving corresponding factors or products, but also
through transactions involving other factors or products. Indeed, a fundamental premise of
economic theory holds that the labor markets in two countries effectively become integrated when
there is either trade, capital mobility, or labor mobility between them.
Capital mobility typically represents jobs searching for workers, which is closely related to
labor mobility, which represents workers searching for jobs. For example, when a Japanese
company establishes an automobile assembly plant in Indonesia, it expresses a demand for
Indonesian labor in Indonesia. Labor market integration between the two countries takes place
* The authors would like to thank Dr. Min Tang, Dr. Pasuk Phongpaichit, Dr. Duncan Campbell,
Mr. Aurelio Parisotto, and other participants at an International Labour Organisation conference
in Bangkok for helpful discussions and comments. The authors would also like to thank Mr.
Pracha Vasuprasat and Mr. Manola Abella for help in accessing labor migration data, and the
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when the Japanese set up factories in Indonesia just as when Indonesian workers migrate to Japan
to work in Japanese factories. Both cases involve international labor market transactions, with
Indonesian workers selling labor services to Japanese firms.
National labor markets may also become integrated though trade. When a country exports
a good it implicitly also exports the labor services embodied in producing that good. For
example, the export of domestically produced electronic goods from Singapore to Malaysia is
roughly equivalent, from the standpoint of labor utilization, to the export of Singaporean capital
and labor to Malaysia where they are used to produce the same goods for local sale.
Transportation and other costs of labor, capital, and product mobility are key determinants of
which option Singaporean firms choose for supplying electronic goods to Malaysian consumers.
The purpose of this paper is to examine labor market integration as it has been achieved
through labor mobility, capital mobility, and trade in east and southeast Asia (ESEA). We do this
by examining aggregate data on each of these three related channels of integration during the
1980s, leaving to this volume's other contributors the task of exploring the microeconomic
aspects of labor market integration, such as vertical integration of private industries between
countries (Gereffi 1995) and the emergence of "growth triangles" (Teal 1995; Thant and Tang
1995; Thant, Tang, and Kakazu 1994). We compare integration within ESEA with integration
involving ESEA and other regions. We also assess the relative contributions of labor mobility,
capital mobility, and trade to labor market integration within the region. In addition, we discuss
the pattern of regional labor market integration during the 1980s in light of changes that occurred
in incentives for integration and in various institutional and economic barriers to integration. We
conclude by speculating on the prospects for, and implications of, further integration.
I. Conceptual Framework
We begin by distinguishing between the concepts of labor market interdependence and
labor market integration. Labor market interdependence refers to the extent to which
perturbations in one country's economy are felt in other countries' labor markets.
Interdependence is thus promoted by the absence of barriers to factor mobility and trade. These
barriers may be purely economic, for example, transportation costs, or they may be institutional,
as in the case of legal restrictions on labor mobility and technology transfer or tariffs and quotas.
By contrast, labor market integration refers to the extent of factor mobility and trade
between two or more economies. Thus, even if two economies are not integrated, perhaps
because the structure of their economies is so similar that it eliminates the possibility of gains to
factor mobility and trade, they may still be interdependent in the sense that a shock experienced in
one economy creates incentives for integrated economic activity.
Much has been written about the causes and consequences of international labor mobility
(see ILO 1992; Macmillen 1982; UN 1992c), with most researchers viewing migration as a
response to spatial differences in labor market conditions (see Abella and Mori 1994; Borjas
1990; Stark 1991). Similarly, spatial arbitrage is the core idea in most studies of capital market
integration, with these studies focusing primarily on four areas: (a) the magnitude of total capital
flows (see Chen 1992; Chen 1993; Ruffin 1993; Yue 1993); (b) the resulting parity of interest
rates across integrated areas (see Haque and Montiel 1991; Mishkin 1984); (c) the correlation
between investment rates and domestic savings rates (Feldstein and Horioka 1980; Frankel 1985)
and (d) the intertemporal behavior of individuals in different countries through tests of Euler
equations for consumption (Obstfeld 1986). Montiel (1994) presents a detailed comparison of
these different indicators of capital market integration.
International trade is driven by comparative advantage, which in turn, according to the
standard Heckscher-Ohlin trade model, is determined by the relative stocks of production factors
across countries. Countries export goods in which they have a comparative advantage, resulting
in the equalization of product and factor prices between trading partners. Assuming that
production technologies are identical for all trading partners, a powerful implication of the
Heckscher-Ohlin model is that trade can lead to full integration of product, capital, and labor
markets even in the absence of international factor movements. Razin and Sadka (1992) point out
that international factor mobility reinforces the integrating effects of trade on factor and product
markets.
In addition to the integration of markets, free international trade also results in increased
income for all trading partners as well as improvements in their welfare. Recently some industrial
countries have argued that many domestic, labor-intensive jobs have been "siphoned" away by
newly industrializing countries in ESEA. Baldwin (1995) reviews studies of the impact of
changing trade patterns on domestic labor markets. He concludes that changes in employment
and relative wages are generally not attributable to evolving trade conditions. Despite
employment declines in particular industries, the employment-creating effects of trade have
outweighed the employment-displacing effects. 1
Even though economic theory suggests that trade alone can potentially substitute for
capital and labor mobility in integrating markets between trading partners, empirically this
situation is rarely found. Rather, high levels of factor flows are typically associated with high
levels of trade flows (Riedel 1992). Note also that labor mobility does not have the same social or
political implications as capital mobility, especially when there are religious, ethnic, or racial
differences between migrants and the host country population. Thus, while movements of labor
and capital have similar effects in promoting factor market integration, they should not be viewed
as perfectly interchangeable. Finally, it is worth noting that at a global level, integration appears
thus far to be more an industrial country than a developing country phenomenon, contributing
significantly to income growth in the industrial countries and reducing disparities in their per
capita incomes (Bloom and Brender 1993).
Along with the standard effects of trade and factor mobility, economic integration also spreads the cost of
economic shocks across integrated markets. For example, the economic consequences of a fall in the demand for
one country's timber because of growing environmental awareness can be diminished by the outmigration of
forestry workers from that country.
II. Empirical Results
Previous empirical work on the topic of economic integration in ESEA has looked mainly
at the growth of capital movements and trade. Yue (1993) and Chen (1993) both document the
increased scale of foreign direct investment in ESEA, although they do not distinguish between
intra and interregional investment. Jha (1994) analyzes the growth of intraregional trade, but does
not compare his findings with the amount of trade carried out with the rest of the world. Riedel
(1992) investigates the link between trade and capital movements within ESEA and finds evidence
of a strong positive association between trade and capital movements. The present analysis builds
on these studies by examining intraregional labor mobility in addition to intraregional trade and
capital mobility, and also by assessing the relative contributions of each mechanism to labor
market integration in ESEA since the early 1980s. For empirical purposes, ESEA comprises ten
economies: China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. Kampuchea, Laos, and Vietnam are excluded
because of a lack of data.
A. Movements of Labor
The labor migration data analyzed in this section were obtained from various International
Labour Organisation (ILO) publications and through personal correspondence with ILO staff in
Bangkok. Unfortunately, the data only refer to the number of documented migrants from the
major labor-sending countries of ESEA. The difficulty in assembling reliable data on total labor
migration is widely recognized, and is due to both a lack of coordination between labor-sending
and labor-receiving countries and to substantial flows of undocumented migrants (see Athukorala
1993; UNDP/ILO 1993).
Table 1 shows the distribution of labor migrants from Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines,
and Thailand — ESEA's major labor-sending countries — among groups of destination countries.
Also reported are average annual growth rates for total numbers of migrants from the four
labor-sending countries to each destination. The growth rates are estimated by regressing the
natural logarithm of annual migration outflows on a simple time trend. For the four countries as a
whole they show a 4.2 percent rate of annual increase. However, the number of outmigrants
destined for ESEA countries grew more than four times as fast (18 percent per year), outpacing
the growth of migration to all other destination groups in the table. Thus, intercountry labor
mobility within ESEA appears to have increased sharply during the 1980s.
By far, the dominant share of outmigrants from the four ESEA labor-sending countries
moved to the Middle East throughout the 1980s, but this share fell precipitously from 88 to 62
percent between 1980-82 and 1989-91 as falling oil prices resulted in essentially zero growth in
the number of Middle East migrants from ESEA. By contrast, the share of ESEA migrants
destined for other Asian countries more than trebled, another indication of sharply increased
intraregional labor mobility.
Table 2 reports the distribution of destinations for labor migrants from Indonesia, the
Philippines, and Thailand. Examination of these distributions reveals that virtually all migrants
from these three countries moved to countries with higher per capita income. This migration
pattern is consistent with the most basic economic model of migration, in which labor mobility is
driven by the search for higher wages. Unfortunately, the main implication of this model — the
fall in wage differentials as labor markets become more integrated — is not testable here because
of a lack of appropriate data. An analysis of cross-country differentials in income per capita
reveals increased inequality from 1979 to 1987 and declining inequality through 1992, with a
small net increase for the overall period.2 However, as per capita income reflects hourly wages,
hours worked, and unearned income and is subject to many influences not controlled for, this
finding does not necessarily contradict the hypothesis that integration promotes convergence in
wages across countries.
Most labor experts believe that ESEA's reported labor migration omits a large flow of
undocumented migration. Rough estimates place the level of undocumented migrants at 40 to 50
We computed Gini coefficients using per capita income data for the ESEA countries. The estimates increased
from 0.51 to 0.56 from 1979 to 1987, but fell to 0.54 in 1992.
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percent of total migration, suggesting that the true flow of intraregional migrants could be as
much as double the figures reported in table 2. Available evidence indicates that most of ESEA's
documented intraregional migrants are unskilled and low-skill workers, a pattern that would
almost certainly be accentuated if data were available on the skill distribution of undocumented
migrants.
Intraregional labor migration flows are quite small in relation to the overall size of the
labor force in the major labor-receiving economies of ESEA (that is, Hong Kong, Japan,
Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan). Even doubling the reported numbers as a crude adjustment
for undocumented migration suggests there were only 470,000 intraregional migrants in 1991,
about 0.6 percent of the total work force in these countries. Although the necessary data are not
available, this percentage would be even smaller if one were able to measure net migration. Even
if one assumes that migrants stay about five years, total labor migration would only account for
about 2 percent of the total labor force in ESEA's labor-receiving countries.
Although foreign workers accounted for a relatively small share of work force size in the
labor-receiving countries of ESEA, labor migration accounted for a relatively large share of labor
force growth in those countries. Documented migrants alone constituted about one-third of labor
force growth in 1991. To the extent that undocumented migrants are counted as part of the labor
force (assuming a doubling of documented migrant numbers), total labor migrants, averaging
roughly 200,000 workers per year in ESEA's labor-receiving countries during the 1980s, would
account for the bulk of work force growth. Thus, intraregional labor mobility in ESEA, although
it is not a large share of the total labor force, appears to contribute significantly to annual labor
force growth in the labor-receiving countries of ESEA.3 Among the labor-sending countries,
outmigration reduced labor force expansion by about 13 percent between 1990 and 1991, thus
serving to even out, albeit slightly, the supply of labor across countries within ESEA.
In terms of direct evidence, the foreign-born share of the Japanese population was a paltry 0.6 percent in 1980
and consisted mostly of Koreans. The foreign-born share increased only slightly during the 1980s, reaching 0.7
percent in 1990. Although Japan is perhaps an extreme example, these figures provide little evidence that the
integration of Japanese and other ESEA country labor markets was achieved through labor mobility.
Unfortunately, similar data are not available for other countries in ESEA.
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Worker remittances are another mechanism through which national economies may
become integrated. Remittances may be used to finance investments in human or physical capital
or to increase consumption of domestically produced goods. Provided the net flows are from
capital-rich to labor-rich countries, remittances will also promote factor price equalization, the
hallmark of full integration. Nominal remittances increased for Filipino, Indonesian, and Thai
workers worldwide at the modest rate of 6 percent per year from 1981 to 1991. This figure
exceeds the 4.2 percent rate of increase in the number of those workers, but by less than the rate
of price inflation, providing evidence of declining real remittances per migrant (assuming the
average length of stay was stable during this period). Among Filipino, Indonesian, and Thai
workers in Singapore, total remittances increased during 1981-91 at a rate of just 4 percent per
year, well below the 25 percent rate of increase in the number of migrants. Thus, there is little
evidence that worker remittances were an important mechanism of economic integration in ESEA
during the 1980s.
B. Movements of Capital
International capital mobility takes a variety of forms. It divides naturally into the mobility
of public capital and the mobility of private capital. Public investment includes grants and loans
from multilateral and bilateral organizations. Private investment includes direct foreign
investments, whereby investors in one country acquire equity interests and direct managerial
influence in enterprises located in another country. Private investment also includes investments
in foreign financial instruments, such as stocks and bonds.
To gauge the extent of capital movements, we examine the amount of direct foreign
investment from ESEA countries to countries within and outside the region.4 Table 3 reports
Direct foreign investment is usually defined as total paid up shares of foreign subsidiaries that are owned by
domestic companies (OECD 1994). Although data on the total amount of direct investment into ESEA are readily
available, data on the sources of this investment are not. Portfolio investments would be a reasonable alternative
indicator of private capital movements, but the source countries for these capital movements is even more difficult
to ascertain.
growth rates of intra and interregional direct foreign investment for ESEA's major capital-sending
countries during the 1980s, namely Hong Kong, Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Singapore. Because
data are not available for a consistent set of years, estimates are reported separately for each
economy.
Direct foreign investment (DFI) from Japan, ESEA's dominant exporter of capital,
increased at an average annual rate of 21 percent during 1980-92. The rate of increase
accelerated in the mid-1980s, following the sharp appreciation of the yen against the dollar
triggered by the 1985 Plaza Accord. Japan's DFI to other ESEA countries, which grew at an
average annual rate of 15 percent from 1980-92, also accelerated in the mid-1980s. This
acceleration is consistent with the view that yen appreciation led Japan to invest in lower-wage
countries in ESEA in an attempt to remain competitive in international product markets.
For Hong Kong and Korea, the 1980s growth rates of DFI within ESEA were greater
than outside ESEA. They were lower for Japan, Taiwan, and Singapore. With the exception of
Korea, ESEA's share of DFI declined among all of ESEA's major capital-sending countries.
Thus, capital mobility furthered ESEA's regional integration in the 1980s, but not as rapidly as it
promoted ESEA's integration with the rest of the world.
Table 4 reports levels of foreign investment by Taiwan and Japan in the ESEA region,
divided into capital movements to current capital-sending countries (Japan, Korea, Hong Kong,
Singapore, and Taiwan) and to current capital-receiving countries (China, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Philippines, and Thailand). The share of investment directed toward the capital-receiving
countries rose from about 43 percent in the early and mid-1980s to 61 percent by the early 1990s.
This shift supports the "flying geese" description of capital investment in the region, according to
which industry is dynamically relocated to suitable lower-wage economies to maintain
international competitiveness (see Tang 1994). Further analysis is needed to assess whether this
description also fits patterns of foreign investment among the newly industrializing economies, a
"cascading" pattern of intraregional capital mobility.
C. Movement of Goods
Table 5 documents the rapid growth of trade within ESEA and between ESEA and the
rest of the world during the 1980s, by reporting growth rates of exports. The figures in the
second column are average annual rates of growth of ESEA exports to different country groups
during 1979-92. The third column shows growth rates of total exports from ESEA and
non-ESEA countries. The reported growth rates are the coefficients of linear trend terms in
simple regression models in which the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the nominal
value of exports (converted to U.S. dollars using period average market exchange rates).
Table 5 indicates that the current dollar value of ESEA's intraregional exports during
1979-92 grew at an average annual rate of 12.2 percent, about one-third faster than the 9.4
percent growth rate of ESEA's inter-regional exports, almost double the growth rate of exports
from non-ESEA industrial countries (7.3 percent), and more than double the growth rate of
exports from all non-ESEA countries (6.0 percent). Thus, in terms of trade growth, ESEA
countries outperformed non-ESEA countries, with the growth of ESEA's intraregional trade
outpacing the growth of its inter-regional trade, which implies even faster integration within
ESEA than between ESEA and the rest of the world.
Table 6 looks at the growth of trade in terms of changes in its distribution among country
groups. The first set of columns reports shares of ESEA exports. The second and third sets of
columns present the shares of total world exports and world GNP for different regions. From
1979-81 to 1990-92, ESEA countries increased their share of world exports from 15 to 22
percent, outpacing the growth in their share of world GNP, which increased from 17 to 22
percent. Equally impressive was the growth in the share of ESEA exports going to ESEA
countries during this same period: from 33 to 41 percent.5
See Jha 1994 for an especially lucid and detailed analysis of the growth of intraregional trade in ESEA and south
Asia.
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Table 7 reports the 1992 level and the 1979-92 growth rates of trade between ESEA
countries. The growth rates are calculated using export data for the endpoints of the time
interval. Although Japan is the region's dominant trading partner, China and Hong Kong have the
largest country-to-country trade flow in ESEA. Overall, 61 percent of exports that stayed within
ESEA in 1992 were accounted for by Japan (31 percent), Hong Kong (15 percent), and China (15
percent), with an additional 17 percent attributable to Taiwan (9 percent) and Korea (8 percent).
The rapid growth of trade between Hong Kong and China and of exports from Japan to Hong
Kong, Korea, and Taiwan account for 41 percent of the growth of intraregional trade.
III. Accounting for Labor Market Integration in ESEA
The foregoing analyses provide evidence that the mechanisms of labor mobility, capital
mobility, and trade have all contributed to labor market integration in ESEA. The purpose of this
section is to measure the overall pace of labor market integration and to assess the relative
importance of each mechanism to the overall process. We do this by converting the amount of
trade and capital mobility within ESEA into units of equivalent labor migration, an exercise that
necessitates estimating: (a) the amount of labor mobility between all pairs of countries in ESEA
that would replace actual flows of capital between the countries, in a way that accounts for
differences between the length of the working life of capital and the duration of stay of labor
migrants; and (b) the amount of labor services embodied in ESEA's intraregional trade.6
To calculate the labor migration equivalent of capital movements, we begin by estimating
the ratio of total labor force to capital stock for each country (see table 8). Following Learner
(1982), the capital stock of a country is assumed to be the accumulated gross domestic investment
An alternative method for calculating labor migration equivalents of capital mobility and trade involves assuming
some production function and then using estimated parameters to map DFI and export values into labor
equivalents. We did not adopt this approach in our analysis because of the difficulty involved in assembling
estimates of the necessary parameters for the different countries within ESEA.
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since 1970, assuming an average ten-year life span for capital due to depreciation.7 As one might
expect, table 8 indicates that the labor to capital ratios for Thailand and Indonesia are much higher
than the ratios for Japan or Singapore, and that the ratios declined over time as more capital was
accumulated while population levels stabilized.8
For the next stage of the exercise, we conduct the following thought experiment: If there
are two countries, (relatively capital-rich) country A and (relatively labor-rich) country B, how
much labor would need to flow from B to A to have the same amount of production as would
result from a capital flow from A to B? The answer is the number of labor migrants from country
B that would have worked with the capital had it remained in country A. We estimate this
number, that is, the labor mobility equivalent of a given capital inflow, under two assumptions.
First, we assume that people's productivity depends on their location (the low estimate). Thus,
workers migrating from country B to country A exhibit the productivity levels of country A's
workers. In this case, we calculate the labor mobility equivalent of a capital inflow by multiplying
a country's total capital exports by the labor to capital stock ratio of the capital-sending country.
Under the second assumption (the high estimate), people's productivity is inherent to them. Now
country B workers moving to country A will have the same productivity as they did in country B,
because their productivity is a function of their education and other personal characteristics. With
this assumption, the labor mobility equivalent calculation involves multiplying a country's total
capital exports by the labor to capital stock ratio of the capital-receiving country. Both estimates
are calculated as they provide an upper and lower bound for labor mobility equivalents.
The final step in this exercise involves accounting for the fact that capital is long-lived.
Suppose, for example, that some piece of capital depreciates fully when it becomes t years old and
that it works with n people (for simplicity, in both the capital-receiving and capital-sending
countries). In this example, the labor mobility equivalent of moving this piece of capital would be
Because of a lack of data on gross domestic investment for Taiwan, we estimate Taiwan's capital stock from data
on gross fixed capital formation. Gross domestic investment equals gross fixed capital formation plus changes in
inventory.
Investment figures for China are not available, so we assume that China's labor to capital ratio is the same as
Indonesia (the most relatively labor abundant country).
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n workers per year, or nt workers over the t year life of the capital. We assume that n workers
moving for each oft years is the same as nt workers moving for one year.
As we assume that capital has a ten-year life span and depreciates linearly, a unit of
foreign direct investment can only be used to full capacity during its first year. By the next year, it
will retain only a fraction of its full value, and even less of its value by the second year. Thus, one
unit of capital moving to a country for ten years is equivalent to five (5 = J (10 — x)dx) units of
capital moving to a country for one year. To complete the capital conversion, we multiply the
labor mobility equivalent by five to express capital mobility in person-years of labor migration.9
To convert trade among ESEA countries to equivalent units of labor migration, we
estimate the amount of labor embodied in exports, that is, the number of workers involved in
producing exports. As mentioned earlier, instead of trading with a partner, a country could
simply export the capital and labor necessary for production and produce the good in the
country's trade partner. The number of workers contributing to the production of exports is
estimated by finding the share of workers in the economy contributing to exports and multiplying
this by the total labor force. Assuming the share of labor in gross national product (GNP) equals
the share of labor in exports, the number of workers contributing to the export sector is simply
the percentage of exports in total production times the total labor force:
Labor mobility equivalent of trade = x total labor force
GNP
Table 9 reports our calculations of equivalent units of labor migration associated with
intraregional trade and capital mobility in 1980 and 1991. The first row presents the documented
number of migrants within ESEA multiplied by the number of years, on average, migrants reside
9
Improving upon this calculation would require data on lagged numbers of ESEA's intercountry migrants, which
are unfortunately not available.
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in the host country — four (low estimate) to six (high estimate) years.10 The labor mobility
equivalents for capital and trade (as calculated above) are reported in the next two rows. Both
calculations for converting capital flows to labor mobility equivalents are provided. The sum of
total labor mobility equivalents is presented in the last row.
The estimates show that trade was overwhelmingly the largest contributor to labor market
integration in ESEA throughout the 1980s. For example, trade embodies a labor flow that is one
to two orders of magnitude greater than that embodied in direct foreign investment and direct
labor movements. The results also show that capital mobility contributed more to regional labor
market integration than did labor mobility.
The figures in table 9 also reveal that labor market integration increased sharply among
ESEA countries in the 1980s. Nearly 9 percent of ESEA's labor force participated, either directly
via labor mobility or indirectly via capital mobility or trade, in cross-national labor market
transactions in 1991, up from just 5.2 percent in 1980.
IV. Conclusions
We have two main results to report: first, the 1980s saw rapid integration of the labor
markets of ESEA countries; and second, the integration was achieved mainly through the sharp
increase in intraregional trade, with a relatively small contribution from intraregional capital
mobility and an even smaller contribution from direct labor mobility.
Notwithstanding the considerable integration of ESEA labor markets that has already
occurred, the prospects for further integration are quite strong. Much of the regional integration
that occurred within ESEA during the 1980s seems to go hand in glove with ESEA's integration
These figures are based on discussions with Mr. Manola Abella at the ILO office in Geneva. Given the
changing composition of labor migrants in the region, accurately estimating duration of stay is difficult. The four
to six years range is based on the idea that it takes approximately this many years in order to recoup the investment
of migration.
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with the rest of the world (also accomplished mainly through sharply rising trade and increased
capital mobility). With the end of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade and the establishment of the World Trade Organization, mutual trade barriers are likely to
diminish, thereby promoting further expansion of trade.
If ESEA's historical response to growing extraregional demand for its goods and services
continues, one may expect further integration within the region. Indeed, as table 10 shows, the
integration ESEA achieved in the 1980s occurred in the presence of nonzero tariff barriers. The
first column in table 10 presents anthan the rates index of tariff restrictions estimated by Lee
(1993) for different countries. The estimates for the regional aggregates are simple averages of
the Lee figures for countries within the region. Although some countries in ESEA did have large
protection indexes, for example, Thailand (0.046) and the Philippines (0.036), the region as a
whole had a lower level of tariff restrictions than other regions. Similarly, in the second column,
average tariff rates for ESEA countries were in general lower than the rates for African countries
and about equal to those for Latin American countries.11
Corresponding to potential further reductions of trade barriers is the considerable scope
for further capital market integration. Negative attitudes and other institutional deterrents to the
movement of capital decreased during the 1980s. This point is documented by table 11, which
describes important laws that ESEA countries have instituted regarding international capital
movements. In all cases, recent country legislation provides for increased incentives to attract
foreign investment and indicates that barriers to capital mobility have diminished significantly
since the late 1980s. For example, China has slowly been phasing in legislation to allow greater
domestic capital ownership by foreign-owned firms.
In contrast to capital mobility, there is no indication that ESEA countries are dissatisfied
with their immigration or emigration flows or that changes in their immigration and emigration
These arguments do not imply that reducing tariff barriers are a sufficient condition for promoting growth in the
region. Indeed, Rodrik (1994) shows that some ESEA countries grew rapidly despite strong trade policy
intervention by their governments.
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policies are likely. Tables 12 and 13 report information on governmental perceptions of and
government policies regarding the level of migration in different ESEA countries. This
information is based on official replies of governments to the United Nations Population Inquiries,
which are conducted every few years. Table 12 reports governmental perceptions in 1983 and
1993. In 1983 only Thailand and Malaysia considered immigration levels "too high," while all the
other countries considered immigration flows to be at a "satisfactory" level. However, by 1993,
only Indonesia perceived that the level of immigration had worsened, while the other countries
either did not change their attitude or thought that the situation had improved. Similarly, we see
that most countries believed that the level of emigration had become more "satisfactory" by 1993.
Table 13 summarizes ESEA policies toward the level of migration. In 1983 all the ESEA
countries were content with their immigration policies and were willing to "maintain" the level of
immigration, while by 1993 three countries wished to "lower" immigration. Conversely, for
emigration policies fewer countries wanted to "raise" emigration levels in 1993 compared to
1983. Both tables 12 and 13 seem to indicate that we may reasonably expect cross-country
migrant labor flows to continue at about the same pace for the next decade. Thus, trade will
likely continue as the main driving force behind integration, followed by capital mobility (which
may increase in importance), and then by labor mobility.
Further declines in the costs of international transportation and communication and the
increased prominence of integrative economic institutions within the region, such as the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation, are likely to promote further integration. Also, given its economic
position and geographic proximity to ESEA, Australia is likely to become more integrated with
the ESEA countries, a development that has already begun. Table 14 shows that Australia's
exports to ESEA countries (8.2 percent) grew at almost twice the rate of Australia's trade with
the rest of the world (4.6 percent) during 1979-92. Similarly, Australia's imports from ESEA
countries also grew at a rate almost 1.5 times as large as its imports from the rest of the world.
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